



**Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

**LESSONS FOR IGAD  
MEDIATION ARISING FROM  
THE SOUTH SUDAN PEACE  
TALKS**

2013 - 2015

**REPORT**

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## Acknowledgements

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This research was conducted by researchers from swisspeace and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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## Disclaimer

The views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of IGAD, Swiss FDFA, or any entities or persons that planned and supported the production of this report. While every attempt was made to ensure that the information published here is accurate, no responsibility is accepted for any loss or damage that may arise out of the reliance of any person upon any of the information this report contains.

This report is readily available on the website of the IGAD Mediation Support Unit <http://mediation.igad.int/>

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**A REPORT on:**

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ARISING FROM THE SOUTH SUDAN  
PEACE TALKS**

**2013 - 2015**

**With the Financial Support of the Swiss Confederation,  
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs**

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# Foreword

## IGAD

Just two-and-half years later after South Sudan gained Independence; civil war broke out in South Sudan.

The IGAD Chairperson immediately convened an extraordinary Summit in Nairobi and a protracted mediation process commenced, culminating in a comprehensive agreement signed by the parties two years later. Despite all the effort and investment, however, the agreement did not hold. This report draws many lessons from that tragic experience.

I am delighted that the IGAD Mediation Support Unit has been able to capture these lessons and the intriguing dynamics that took place during the mediation. This report is an honest reflection on the various roles that the IGAD mediators and partners played at various stages of the process.

It is my sincere belief that the lessons learned will inform future IGAD mediation efforts. We are committed to strengthen our mediation capacity and grateful for the support we continue to receive from our partners, including the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

I wish also to express my gratitude to the researchers from swisspeace and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, as well as the Sudd Institute. The report would not have been complete without the valuable perspectives of mediators, advisers, parties and supporters, as well as civil society perceptions.

I encourage the IGAD Member States, Secretariat, partners and other friends to read the report and heed the lessons.

As a region and an institution, IGAD has developed from mitigating the effects of drought and desertification, in accordance with our initial mandate, to addressing broader issues of climate change and social development, economic cooperation and regional integration, as well as peace and security. We are up to the task and are striving collectively to prosper as a region.



**Hon. Siraj Fegessa**  
*Director*

Peace and Security Division  
Intergovernmental Authority on Development

## Foreword (Swiss FDFA)

Learning from conflict, learning from negotiations and learning from mediation practice – these are the objectives of this remarkable publication by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), swisspeace and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. We commend IGAD's courage and honesty in undertaking this lessons-learned study on its mediation of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) between 2013 and 2015. It offers interested readers, politicians, mediators and conflict resolution practitioners worldwide rare and in-depth insights into the nuts and bolts of a highly complex mediation in a unique and sensitive situation. This publication creates a space of openness in a world that is usually closed to observers.

IGAD has gained recognition and respect as a guarantor of peace and security in the region. Having mediated the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Sudan (CPA) and accompanied its challenging implementation, it supported the Republic of South Sudan's independence on 9 July 2011. When violent conflict broke out in South Sudan just before Christmas 2013 after two years of stability, IGAD stepped in again and mediated between the parties, thereby facilitating the signing of the ARCSS in August 2015 in Addis Ababa. Tragically, peace did not hold and South Sudan fell back into war. Today, our hopes lie with the full implementation of the revitalised ARCSS (R-ARCSS), which was signed in September 2018, again under the auspices of IGAD.

Good offices are a central pillar of Swiss foreign policy. Switzerland has supported numerous peace mediation initiatives in the region since the late 1990s, and has worked closely with IGAD in its efforts to build and sustain peace during the CPA implementation period and since the Republic of South Sudan gained its independence in 2011. Today, Switzerland remains strongly committed to efforts to further peace and development in South Sudan. Given our longstanding dedication to contributing to peace in South Sudan and our strong partnership with IGAD, we were delighted to accept the request from the IGAD Secretariat to support its endeavours to draw lessons from its mediation efforts, which resulted in the signing of the 2015 ARCSS. The lessons contained in this study provide valuable insights for all stakeholders working to bring peace to the region and will contribute to professionalising mediation practice across the world.

We applaud IGAD's readiness to learn from its past mediation activities and to openly share its insights from the ARCSS mediation with us and other peace practitioners in the region and beyond. Let us take a close look at what worked and what did not. As we approach the end of the R-ARCSS pre-transition period, we believe that the lessons set out in this report will help us to better assist the people of South Sudan in the quest for lasting peace.



**Ambassador Heidi Grau**  
*Head, Human Security Division*  
Swiss Confederation, Federal Department of  
Foreign Affairs Political Directorate

## Executive Summary

This report focuses on the IGAD-led mediation process from December 2013 to August 2015 to address the conflict in South Sudan. As per a project initiated, led and owned by IGAD, it identifies lessons from the South Sudan peace talks with the aim to inform future IGAD mediation efforts. These lessons are based on interviews conducted by a team of researchers with mediators, advisers, parties and supporters as well as an analysis of internal IGAD documents concerning the South Sudan peace talks.

The report highlights the commitment of IGAD to peacemaking in South Sudan, stepping in within days of the outbreak of violence on 15 December 2013 in Juba, convening an extraordinary Summit and mandating a mediation process led by highly experienced envoys. IGAD's resolute action helped to prevent further escalation of violence, kept the parties focused on negotiating a political settlement and produced a comprehensive peace agreement signed in August 2015.

However, the August 2015 agreement failed to bring peace to South Sudan. This is because the parties lacked genuine willingness to make peace. This condition indeed characterized the South Sudan peace talks throughout. The report cautions IGAD mediators not to rush the process of negotiations. In the interests of sustainable peace, there may be no alternative to strategic patience until the parties reach a sufficient degree of consensus and reconciliation.

When the talks reached a standstill in early 2015, IGAD mediators and partners applied leverage, pushing the parties to sign an agreement. This included increased diplomatic pressure, the imposition of targeted sanctions, the threat of an arms embargo and a directive mediation strategy presenting parties with an agreement on a take it or leave it basis. While this strategy produced an agreement, it undermined the parties' ownership of the agreement, without which sustainable peace is not possible.



## Part I: Background and introduction

1. Some nine years after the IGAD-facilitated Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the Second Sudanese Civil War, and two and a half years after South Sudan became an independent state, armed violence erupted in Juba in December 2013 and spread across the country. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) responded swiftly and within two weeks mandated a mediation process led by three special envoys from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. The process went through multiple rounds of talks and intermediary agreements, concluding in August 2015 when the parties signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS).<sup>1</sup>
2. This report identifies lessons arising from the IGAD-led mediation process from December 2013 to August 2015 to address the conflict in South Sudan. While there are a number of external publications on mediation in South Sudan (Annex 3), this report is the outcome of a lessons learned exercise initiated, led and owned by IGAD. It complements a report of April 2016, in which the IGAD Special Envoys, upon conclusion of their mandate, provided a detailed account of the IGAD-led mediation process, including an assessment of its different phases and the evolution of the parties' positions. Building on this, the focus of this report is forward-looking, identifying lessons that should inform IGAD mediation efforts in the future.
3. As such, this exercise is part of IGAD's commitment to strengthen its mediation capacity and initiatives, as evidenced by the IGAD High-Level Consultative Meeting on Mediation in February 2012, the creation of a Mediation Support Unit (MSU) within the Peace and Security Division of the IGAD Secretariat and the endorsement of mediation guidelines by the IGAD Committee of Ambassador in June 2017.
4. The IGAD Secretariat initiated and led the present mediation lessons learned exercise. Throughout the process, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has provided support as part of its standing partnership with IGAD. The partnership is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
5. As per the MoU, IGAD and FDFA mandated researchers from swisspeace and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame to support the lessons learned exercise. The researchers visited Addis Ababa (three times), Juba, Nairobi and Washington DC, conducted several phone interviews,

<sup>1</sup> The agreement can be downloaded as a PDF document from this website: [https://igad.int/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1193:agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150](https://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1193:agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=150)

and thereby gathered the perspectives of mediators, advisers, parties, and supporters. They also did background research and analyzed internal documents put at their disposal by the IGAD Secretariat. As per the MoU the researchers also commissioned a study by the Sudd Institute in Juba, assessing civil society perceptions of the IGAD-led peace talks in South Sudan as well as efforts to promote the inclusivity of the talks.

6. The report does not provide a comprehensive history of IGAD mediation in South Sudan, but focuses on selected themes of the process in order to formulate forward-looking lessons. The themes comprise IGAD's role as a mediator, early action to address the conflict in South Sudan, the role of the IGAD Special Envoy and their team, the mediation mandate and the role of IGAD Summits, the mediation strategy, efforts to include non-military stakeholders in the talks, issues of ripeness and leverage, negotiation dynamics at the table, aspects related to the implementation of the agreement, international support for IGAD's mediation efforts and questions of funding and logistics.
7. On many of the issues covered here, the researchers heard contradictory opinions among those they interviewed. The report presents the conclusions drawn by the researchers, based on their judgment and the available evidence, but recognizes that others may have valid disagreements with these conclusions. Given the current situation in South Sudan, it is clear that the IGAD-mediated peace agreement has not brought peace to the country. This does not mean, however, that the IGAD mediation is to blame for the failure. The responsibility for the breakdown of the agreement and the renewed fighting lies, here as always, with the conflict parties.
8. The structure of the report is as follows: After the present introduction, part II provides a synopsis of the situation in South Sudan from December 2013 to July 2016, covering the outbreak of violence, the peace talks, and the first year of ARCSS implementation. The synopsis is deliberately brief and descriptive, focusing on the main events. The final report of the African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, released in October 2014, can be consulted for a more detailed account that also captures the narratives of the different conflict parties. The core of the report is contained in part III, providing the main insights and lessons across eleven themes of the IGAD-led mediation process in South Sudan. For each theme, the report outlines the experience from the South Sudan peace talks and formulates lessons for future IGAD mediation. The annex of the report includes a timeline of the mediation process, the questionnaire used during the interviews and a list of selected external publications.

## Part II: Synopsis of the situation in South Sudan, 2013-2016

9. On 15 December 2013, South Sudan witnessed an outbreak of violence. Fighting erupted among members of the Presidential Guard, between soldiers loyal to President Salva Kiir Mayardit and those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar Teny. Violence quickly escalated and spread to other parts of Central Equatoria as well as to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.<sup>2</sup> Estimates of casualties from the first three days of fighting ranged from 600 to 20'000.<sup>3</sup> 352'000 South Sudanese were internally displaced within four weeks after the violence broke out, while others fled to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda at a rate of 3'000 to 4'000 persons a day.<sup>4</sup>
10. The outbreak of violence in December 2013 was the outcome of tensions within the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which had come to the fore when President Kiir dissolved his cabinet in July 2013, dismissing a number of senior officials including Vice President Machar and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun. This followed challenges to the President's leadership, aired at a meeting of the SPLM Political Bureau in March 2013, and subsequent declarations by Machar and Amun to unseat Kiir as SPLM Chairman at the next SPLM National Convention. The tensions intensified in November 2013 when the President announced the dissolution of SPLM party structures and they escalated further at a meeting of the SPLM National Liberation Council on 14 and 15 December, triggering a shoot-out among Presidential Guards and the spread of violence in the following days.<sup>5</sup> The Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) arrested a number of senior SPLM officials. Riek Machar escaped to Jonglei State, where he organized the armed resistance later known as SPLA/M In-Opposition (IO).
11. Going beyond these short-term events, the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan identified a number of historic, institutional and structural root causes that explain why some of the violence took an ethnic character. The Commission mentioned in this connection colonialism and the use of 'native administration' by colonial rulers, the weakness of state institutions in South Sudan,

<sup>2</sup> Please note that this section covers events from December 2013 to July 2016 and therefore uses the names of states in South Sudan before GRSS announced an expansion of the number of states in October 2016.

<sup>3</sup> See African Union, Final Report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 27 October 2015, paras 385 and 386.

<sup>4</sup> See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), South Sudan Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot, online report, 10 January 2014, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Hum\\_Snapshot\\_10\\_Jan\\_2014.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Hum_Snapshot_10_Jan_2014.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> On the genesis of the violence outbreak in South Sudan, see Sudd Institute, South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-Conflict Prospects, special report published on 3 August 2014.

historic tensions within the SPLM, unaddressed grievances of victims of the previous civil wars and inequality in the distribution of peace dividends after the CPA. The Commission also shed light on the different narratives of the conflict parties, who have different perspectives on why the conflict erupted, what happened and who was responsible.

12. The international community immediately responded to the outbreak of violence in South Sudan. The IGAD Council Ministers, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy to the AU were the first to visit Juba and urge a stop of the violence. On 26 December, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta met with President Kiir, cabinet members and the detained SPLM leaders in Juba. These efforts led to an extraordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government in Nairobi. In the resulting Communiqué, IGAD called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and mandated an IGAD-led mediation process. Three IGAD Special Envoys were to lead the process: Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya and General Mohammed El Dhabhi of Sudan.
13. In the beginning, the IGAD Special Envoys focused on stopping the violence on the ground. The talks began in early January 2014. Within two weeks, on 23 January 2014, GRSS and SPLA/M-IO signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH), which established humanitarian corridors, and a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) to oversee the agreement and secure the parties' compliance. However, implementation was marred by difficulties and fighting between the two sides continued. The greater Upper Nile region continued to be the epicenter of the conflict, but violence spread to other areas of South Sudan as well. Fighting was intense around the towns of Bentiu, Bor and Malakal, which changed hands between government and opposition forces during the conflict. Between April and August 2014, the MVM reported twelve instances of CoH violations in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile.<sup>6</sup> By June 2014, the count of internally displaced persons (IDPs) had reached 1.1 million,<sup>7</sup> refugees totaled 533'981,<sup>8</sup> and 7.3 million South Sudanese were classified at risk of food insecurity.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> IGAD South Sudan Office, Summary of Reports of Cessation of Hostilities Violations, online report, 21 August 2014, [http://igad.int/attachments/944\\_Summary%20of%20Reports%20of%20Cessation%20of%20Hostilities%20%28COHs%29%20Violations%20%28as%20at%2021August%202014%29.pdf](http://igad.int/attachments/944_Summary%20of%20Reports%20of%20Cessation%20of%20Hostilities%20%28COHs%29%20Violations%20%28as%20at%2021August%202014%29.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Key Figures: People internally displaced by violence, online database, 8 December 2017, <http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan>.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees and asylum-seekers from South Sudan: Total, online database, 8 December 2017, <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php>.

<sup>9</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot, online report, 20 June 2014, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/south%20sudan%20snapshot.pdf>.

14. On 23 January, the parties also signed an agreement on the Status of Detainees. GRSS subsequently released seven of the detained SPLM leaders in late January and the remaining four in late April 2014. The released SPLM leaders subsequently participated in the peace talks under the label 'Former Detainees' (FDs). Thereafter the IGAD Special Envoys focused on securing agreement on the main parameters of the talks. The result was an agreement signed on 9 May 2014, in which the parties agreed to the agenda of the talks, the principle of forming a transitional government and the inclusion of non-military stakeholders, namely civil society organizations, women's and youth groups, faith-based leaders, the FDs and other political parties.
15. IGAD mediators subsequently facilitated a multi-stakeholder symposium, in which a large number of South Sudanese participated, although the process faced difficulties. Between June and November 2014, multiple rounds of talks succeeded in fleshing out the substantive issues that laid the foundation for an agreement. However, the two warring parties failed to meet their own stated deadline of March 2015 for concluding a comprehensive settlement, as the talks stalled around controversial issues related to power sharing and security arrangements. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. By late April 2015, the MV reported 39 incidents of violations in Juba as well as Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.<sup>10</sup> The number of IDPs totaled 1'524'626,<sup>11</sup> while the refugee count rose to 631'141.<sup>12</sup> From the 7.3 million people classified at risk of food insecurity in June 2014, UNOCHA estimated that 4.6 million were severely food insecure one year later, with places in Upper Nile and Warrap classified at emergency level.<sup>13</sup>
16. In June 2015, the IGAD Heads of State and Government therefore revitalized the process through launching IGAD-Plus. This expanded format was intended to deepen the cooperation between IGAD member states and its main partners, i.e. the AU Commission and its High-Level Ad hoc Committee (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa), the Troika (United States, United Kingdom and Norway), China, the UN and the European Union (EU). In what followed, IGAD put forward a draft compromise agreement in July 2015, asking the warring parties to consult within their ranks and

<sup>10</sup> IGAD South Sudan Office, Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, online report, 30 April 2015, <http://www.southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/290/Website%20Violations%20Summary%20V39%20ENG.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Key Figures.

<sup>12</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from South Sudan, online database, 31 January 2018, <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php>.

<sup>13</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Crisis: Humanitarian Snapshot, online report, 5 June 2015, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South\\_Sudan\\_Humanitarian\\_Snapshot\\_05Jun2015.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_Humanitarian_Snapshot_05Jun2015.pdf)

negotiate amendments with each other.

17. On 17 August 2015, the SPLM-IO and the FDs signed ARCSS as parties, with faith-based leaders, eminent personalities, women's block, civil society organizations, IGAD Plus and other international community representatives signing as witnesses. The GRSS requested more time to consult in Juba. Finally, on 26 August, the GRSS signed, while at the same time presenting their reservations to several sections of the agreement.
18. ARCSS implementation proved difficult. A notable achievement was the return of the SPLM-IO to Juba in December 2015 and the instatement of its leader Riek Machar as First Vice President in April 2016. However, many transitional institutions in the peace agreement were delayed or failed to be set up. Tensions mounted in Juba with the presence of forces from both sides. On 8 July 2016, fighting occurred between guards loyal to the First Vice President and others loyal to the President. Riek Machar subsequently fled South Sudan and has since remained in exile, while the former SPLM-IO chief negotiator Taban Deng Gai was instated as First Vice President.
19. One year after its signing, it was evident that ARCSS had not brought peace to South Sudan. The situation on the ground has remained extremely difficult, with extensive armed violence going beyond the previous main theaters of fighting.<sup>14</sup> Areas in Equatorian states were particularly affected, as violence spread after July 2016 with new lines of conflicts emerging. The humanitarian situation has consequently continued to deteriorate. By July 2016, the number of IDPs had grown to 1'619'048,<sup>15</sup> while refugees amounted to 826'918.<sup>16</sup> UNOCHA reported that at the height of the lean season in July 2016, "4.8 million people... more than one in three people in South Sudan... were estimated to be severely food insecure."<sup>17</sup> In 2017, food insecurity in the country reached crisis level when a state of famine was declared in Leer and Mayendit counties in southern Unity.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) South Sudan, CTSAMM Violation Reports, online report, <http://ctsamm.org/reports-documents/ctsamm-violation-reports/>.

<sup>15</sup> UNOCHA, South Sudan Key Figures.

<sup>16</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and asylum-seekers from South Sudan.

<sup>17</sup> UNOCHA, 2017 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, online report, December 2016, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South\\_Sudan\\_2017\\_Humanitarian\\_Needs\\_Overview.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_2017_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview.pdf), page 2.

<sup>18</sup> UNOCHA, 2018 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview, online report, November 2017, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South\\_Sudan\\_2018\\_Humanitarian\\_Needs\\_Overview.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South_Sudan_2018_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview.pdf), page 7.

## Part III: Lessons for IGAD mediation

20. This part of the draft report focuses on eleven themes related to the IGAD-led mediation process in South Sudan, based on the interviews conducted by the researchers, the commissioned study on civil society perceptions and an analysis of publications and IGAD documents. Each theme includes an overall assessment of the peace talks as well as lessons for consideration in future IGAD mediation efforts. A more comprehensive account with factual information about the process is contained in the IGAD Special Envoys' concluding report of April 2016.<sup>19</sup>

### Theme #1: IGAD as a mediator

#### *Experience from the South Sudan peace talks*

21. IGAD reacted swiftly to the outbreak of violence in Juba and took leadership of the political process from the outset. The conflict in South Sudan had a direct impact on IGAD member states, for example through refugee flows. Through its early and resolute engagement, IGAD signaled that the situation in South Sudan was of concern for the region as a whole and that action needed to be taken to prevent an escalation of violence. It also signaled that peace in South Sudan – one of the important achievements for the region and for IGAD as an organization in light of its facilitation of the CPA – had to be preserved. Six extraordinary Summits as well as three additional gatherings of IGAD Heads of State and Government to deal with the situation in South Sudan is evidence of their commitment.
22. When IGAD got involved in trying to restore peace in South Sudan, it drew on its experience in mediating the CPA. It was an advantage that the Special Envoys IGAD appointed to lead the South Sudan mediation had firsthand experience in the CPA negotiations – General Sumbeiywo as chief mediator, Ambassador Mesfin as foreign minister of Ethiopia and General El-Dabi as a senior official of the Sudan government at the time. This meant that the IGAD mediation team had deep knowledge of the context and that the Special Envoys had pre-existing personal relationships with the conflict parties, which proved useful in the process.

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<sup>19</sup> Report of the Special Envoys on the Conclusion of the IGAD-Led Mediation to Resolve the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (2013-2015), IGAD report, April 2016. The Special Envoys presented the report to the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 5 April 2016: <https://igad.int/divisions/peace-and-security/1309-igad-honored-its-special-envoys-to-south-sudan-on-the-occasion-of-the-submission-of-the-final-report>

23. A further asset was that the international community endorsed and supported IGAD mediation in South Sudan from the beginning. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2132 on 24 December 2013, in which it commended IGAD's efforts "in seeking to open the dialogue and mediate between key leaders". Likewise, the AU Peace and Security Council in a Communiqué adopted on 30 December 2013 encouraged different AU structures "to support the inclusive dialogue to be facilitated by IGAD through its newly-appointed Special Envoys". The Troika countries that had helped advance the CPA negotiations also threw their support behind the IGAD mediation effort.
24. During the CPA negotiations from 2002 to 2005, IGAD member states had unity of purpose, supporting the negotiations led by General Sumbeiywo. They agreed on the principle of using mediation to address the armed conflict in Sudan, which, after nearly twenty years of fighting, was characterized by a stalemate. IGAD countries also agreed on the main parameters of a settlement outlined in the Declaration of Principles of 1993. This unity of purpose was absent in 2013 and 2014. IGAD member states had different views of the conflict and how to address it, and they pursued different interests.
25. These divisions, which came to the fore in different moments of the process, undermined the credibility and cohesion of the mediation. As the International Crisis Group wrote, "regional divisions rendered IGAD incapable of putting unified pressure on the South Sudanese parties."<sup>20</sup> One example is the regional protection force to shore up the CoH agreement, which IGAD Heads of State and Government decided to establish in March 2014 without having clarity on its terms. The subsequent disagreements among member states about the mandate and composition of the force undermined IGAD's unity in the South Sudan peace process and detracted focus from the mediation. According to interviewees, the lack of unity within IGAD was at times felt in the mediation team, which reduced confidence in the process among conflict parties, other South Sudanese stakeholders and partners.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

26. *IGAD should continue to use mediation as a key instrument to address peace and security problems in the region. It should take a leadership role in mediating conflicts in the region when it has the political*

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<sup>20</sup> International Crisis Group, Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process, Report no. 228, 27 July 2015, p. 3.



*commitment of its leaders, when member states agree on a joint strategy and objectives and when the conflict parties agree to IGAD mediation.*

27. *As a possible way to address internal challenges, IGAD should strengthen the Mediation Unit to independently provide technical advice to contentious issues and/or engage with other mediation mechanisms e.g AU, UN, following the principle of Subsidiarity, Complementarity and Comparative Advantage.*

## **Theme #2: Early action and crisis response**

### ***Experience from the South Sudan peace talks***

28. Even before the violence eruption in Juba on 15 December 2013, there were clear indications that major armed conflict was a possibility in South Sudan. As the AU Commission of Inquiry noted, “It is quite clear ... that the outbreak of violence in December 2013 was not an isolated event: all indications ... are that the crisis built up over time.”<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the rift within the SPLM kept worsening in the course of 2013, in particular after the dissolution of the cabinet in July. In what followed, the protagonists made antagonistic statements and conducted recruitment driven to increase the number of armed personnel at their disposal. However, the international community, including IGAD, did not respond in a sufficiently coherent manner to prevent this scenario. There were different preventive diplomacy attempts by the AU, UN, IGAD and other actors, but according to interviewees, these efforts were not sufficiently robust and did not change the parties’ cost-benefit calculation to abstain from the use of violence. Interviewees also highlighted that preventive diplomacy initiatives before 15 December were isolated and not sufficiently coordinated and unified.
29. After violence broke out in Juba in the evening of 15 December, IGAD reacted fast and showed high commitment and leadership. A high-level ministerial delegation was dispatched to Juba on 19 December, meeting the parties together with senior AU and UN representatives and urging an immediate cessation of hostilities. On 26 December, the Chairperson of IGAD, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, and President of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta went to Juba. The following day, on 27 December, an extraordinary session of IGAD Heads of State and Government convened in Nairobi. In its Communiqué, the Summit mandated

<sup>21</sup> Final Report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, para 57.

a mediation process to deal with the situation in South Sudan and appointed Special Envoys to lead it. In what followed, the mediators consulted parties and prepared for the first round of talks, which started on 4 January 2014 in Addis Ababa.

30. While IGAD early action did not prevent the violence from spreading, several interviewees emphasized that it helped prevent full-blown escalation. Given the brutality of the violence in Juba and its ethnic character, armed conflict in South Sudan could indeed have reached an even greater magnitude. That this did not happen also had to do with the swift and robust diplomatic engagement by IGAD, signaling to the parties that the use of violence was unacceptable and that they instead needed to resolve their differences at the negotiation table. Likewise, when the negotiations were ongoing, IGAD made sure the international community paid attention to the situation in South Sudan, making a strategy of violence escalation more costly for the conflict parties. This evidently did not stop violence, but it is reasonable to argue that it helped to curb a full-blown violence outbreak throughout the country.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

31. *Rapid reaction after violence erupts is critical to avoid further escalation. Dispatching a high-level delegation and convening an IGAD Summit early on sends a strong message to the parties. IGAD's response after the violence in Juba in December 2013 can be seen as a best practice in this regard.*
32. *IGAD should use dialogue and mediation as a means of conflict prevention before violence breaks out. Coordination of efforts between IGAD, AU and UN is crucial for preventive diplomacy to succeed. The UN is well placed to coordinate preventive diplomacy efforts.*
33. *IGAD should further strengthen the early warning capabilities in its Secretariat (**CEWARN**), which helps to recognize the potential for violence outbreaks, and take preventive diplomacy actions accordingly.*

## **Theme #3: Special Envoys and mediation team**

### ***Experience from the South Sudan peace talks***

34. IGAD appointed three Special Envoys to lead the mediation process in South Sudan. The Special Envoys reported directly to the IGAD Heads of State and Government. This was different

from the CPA negotiations, where the IGAD mediator reported to the IGAD Council of Ministers. The Special Envoys represented three frontline countries, which had influence in South Sudan and which were affected by the conflict: Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. This was useful to ensure these countries' support for the peace talks. However, the IGAD Heads of State and Government did not appoint a Special Envoy from Uganda due to the country's military engagement in South Sudan. This was understandable as a way to emphasize the impartiality of the mediation effort.

35. The IGAD Special Envoys were eminent and highly experienced personalities from the region. They possessed deep knowledge of South Sudan and knew the conflict parties personally. This proved useful during the process and signaled to the parties the seriousness of the mediation effort. The mediation mandate from the Summit neither provided a formal hierarchy among the Special Envoys nor specified a division of labor. IGAD documents, for example the Communiqué of the extraordinary IGAD Summit of 13 March 2014, later referred to Ambassador Mesfin as the "Chairperson of the IGAD Mediation team", but the hierarchy was not formalized. Several interviewees emphasized that the lack of hierarchy made disagreements between the Special Envoys difficult to resolve and sometimes led to inconsistent messages to the parties. The presence of three eminent personalities also created challenges in terms of coordinating schedules. Some observers noted that the process lacked leadership when the Special Envoys and senior advisers were absent.
36. The IGAD mediation was set up swiftly, with initial funding from IGADs' Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and stopgap support to the Special Envoys from the IGAD Somalia Facilitation Office. IGAD later established the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan, which was based in Addis Ababa. The mediation process was driven by member states and the mediation team built around the Special Envoys. As in the CPA negotiations, this meant that the IGAD Secretariat in Djibouti, including its MSU, was not involved in strategic aspects of the mediation process. However, the IGAD Secretariat provided administrative support and dispatched personnel to support the Special Envoys in the beginning.
37. The mediation team was initially staffed with experts from the IGAD Secretariat. Over time, external mediation experts were hired to support the Special Envoys. Each Envoy brought on board a small team of advisers, with whom they had worked before. Some support was channeled through the Transitional

Support Unit, which was primarily financed by Norway and initially created to support the AU High Level Implementation Panel. The mediation team grew within the first months. An organizational chart was established, Terms of Reference (ToR) drafted for different functions and technical experts recruited. Nevertheless, interviewees reported that coordination and unity between the Special Envoys and their advisers was at times impaired, which had a negative impact on the coherence of the mediation strategy and the parties' confidence in the process.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

38. *For future appointments, IGAD should weigh arguments for and against a single envoy model – which offers more cohesion, but possibly less regional buy-in – and a multiple envoys model – which poses challenges in terms of cohesion and coordination, but provides more buy-in and sources of leverage. If more than one mediator is appointed, the mandate should ideally specify a lead mediator in order to create clear leadership. Senior mediators should commit full-time to the process. The head of the mediation team should cultivate a sense of cohesion and unity of purpose within the team.*
39. *When IGAD issues a mediation mandate, a support office should immediately be set up. The office should be supported by the IGAD Secretariat, in particular its MSU, but constitute a separate structure physically located where the talks take place. IGAD could benefit from developing a general blueprint for establishing mediation operations, inspired by those of other mediating bodies, such as the UN's Mediation Startup Guidelines.*
40. *IGAD should have a generic plan, developed and managed by its MSU, detailing different functions in a mediation team, covering political advice, technical expertise and administrative support. The aim should be to establish a cohesive team with clear hierarchies, responsibilities, reporting and communication lines. Resources for swift recruitment of team members should be available.*
41. *The IGAD Secretariat should fulfil a stopgap function, running the support office until recruitments are processed and funding is available. Its MSU should be involved to provide mediation expertise, suggest experts to be hired into the mediation team, conduct trainings, provide lessons learned from past mediation engagements and ensure institutional memory. Once the support office is operational, a clear division of labor should be established, with the IGAD Secretariat providing administrative support, informing member states and raising funds.*

## Theme #4: Mediation mandate and IGAD Summits

### *Experience from the South Sudan peace talks*

42. While the peace talks were going on, IGAD held six extraordinary Summits of Heads of State and Government with resulting Communiqués as well as three additional Summit meetings. This shows the commitment of IGAD to the process and the priority that the whole region gave to peacemaking in South Sudan.
43. The political mandate of the IGAD mediation process derived from the Communiqué of the first extraordinary IGAD Summit on 27 December 2013. It specified that IGAD should address the situation in South Sudan through “the pursuit of a political solution including an all inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders concerned”. It further stressed the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities and stipulated that the dialogue should review the status of the detained SPLM leaders. The Summit also appointed Special Envoys with the understanding that they were going to lead the mediation process, with support from the IGAD Secretariat.
44. The fact that IGAD mediators received a political mandate from the highest level and early on in the crisis was useful on multiple accounts. Interviewees emphasized that it gave authority to the Special Envoys and made clear to the parties that they had to engage in the process. It further ensured that international actors rallied behind the IGAD effort. Both the UN and the AU were quick to endorse the IGAD process following the Summit Communiqué of 27 December, signaling to the parties that there was no alternative negotiation forum. The Communiqué also set the main parameters of the talks – namely that the talks had to be inclusive, going beyond the main belligerents, that a cessation of hostilities was pressing and that the talks had to address the status of the detainees. This provided clarity and guidance to the Special Envoys and parties before the talks started. Finally, once the negotiations were going on, the involvement of IGAD Heads of State and Government provided leverage to advance the process at crucial moments.
45. Another useful contribution of the frequent IGAD Summits was that the mediation mandate was regularly updated, allowing for a periodic synchronization of the mandate with developments at the table and on the ground. For example, the IGAD Summit of 31 January 2014 endorsed the CoH and status of detainees agreements and instructed the Special Envoys to focus on developing a framework and modalities for the subsequent talks

on substantive matters. Likewise, the Communiqué of the 10 June 2014 Summit endorsed the framework agreement and urged the parties to engage in substantive negotiations about the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). The IGAD Summits therefore ensured that the Special Envoys had the necessary political support for the next phase of the process.

46. At times, however, consultations took place on the margins of IGAD Summits in a way that was insufficiently coordinated with the mediation team, allowing the parties to engage with the different IGAD actors and bodies. For example, the Summit of 25 August 2014 amended the draft text prepared by the mediation team on transitional arrangements. According to the revised text, the nominee for Prime Minister, a post foreseen for SPLM-IO, would not be able to hold public office after national elections at the end of the transitional period. Not surprisingly, GRSS signed the amended protocol, along with the IGAD leaders, but SPLM-IO and other stakeholders rejected the text. This undercut the mediation team and the process, as the Special Envoys had to manage the fallout between the parties and create a new basis for them to discuss power sharing at the executive level. Another problem with the Summit as consultation forums was that in the first two summits, only one party, i.e. the GRSS, could formally participate in the Summit, which created a definite imbalance.
47. Aside from the political mandate from the Summit, the Special Envoys did not receive specific instructions from a political body of IGAD. While this gave flexibility to the Special Envoys, it also meant that they had to set up the process from scratch and that some questions, such as the hierarchy and division of labor between Special Envoys, remained open.
48. As far as a mandate from the conflict parties is concerned, the GRSS explicitly consented to IGAD mediation through the Communiqué of the 27 December 2013 IGAD Summit, in which South Sudanese foreign minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin participated. SPLM-IO effectively consented to IGAD mediation during preparatory consultations and by participating in the first round of talks in January 2014. The parties' mandate was renewed and made explicit in the agreement of 9 May 2014, which spells out the framework of the talks and in which the parties "resolve to engage in substantive discussions, via the IGAD-led peace process".

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

49. *Extraordinary IGAD Summits during peace talks are useful to show the*

*region's commitment to a mediation process, to provide a mandate to mediators, to endorse agreements, as a source of leverage for the mediators and to promote regional ownership. However, Summits should not become alternative forums for negotiations between the parties. The mediators should lead the negotiations and, within the constraints of their mandate, they should be granted flexibility to steer the negotiations in the direction they deem necessary.*

50. *Obtaining a mandate early on in the process is essential, conferring authority and leverage on the mediators, ensuring international support and defining the overall objectives of the process.*
51. *On the basis of the political mandate provided by IGAD Heads of State and Government, a lower-level political body, such as the IGAD Council of Ministers, could provide specific instructions to IGAD mediators, e.g. in the form of ToRs.*
52. *Obtaining a mandate from the parties in the beginning of the process is important, as it signifies the parties' willingness to cooperate with the mediators and commits the parties to the process.*

## **Theme #5: Mediation strategy and sequencing of talks**

### ***Experience from the South Sudan peace talks***

53. IGAD's mediation strategy in South Sudan had three core components. First, IGAD sought to achieve a ceasefire at the beginning of the talks in order to quickly generate tangible benefits and build momentum towards a broad-based process tackling root causes, including stakeholders beyond the warring parties and paving the way for sustainable peace. Second, IGAD was leading the process, but intended to mobilize international support and leverage, especially towards the end of the process in order to achieve a peace agreement. Third, the mediators hoped to advance the negotiations incrementally through a series of intermediary agreements, building momentum towards a final comprehensive agreement concluding the mediation process. These elements derived from the political mandate included in the Communiqué of the IGAD Summit of 27 December 2013. They were further specified in documents drafted by the mediation team throughout the process, including a detailed mediation strategy document completed in June 2014.
54. Given developments on the ground, the strategy by the Special Envoys led to a process divided into four main stages. During the first stage, the mediation process focused on stopping the violence

and addressing the question of the detained SPLM leaders. This stage concluded with the signature of the two agreements on CoH and detainees on 23 January 2014. In the second stage, the Special Envoys sought to reach an agreement on the framework and modalities of the talks, including the question of who got a seat at the negotiation table. This resulted in the agreement of 9 May 2014 and an agenda for the talks. The third stage involved negotiations on substantive issues in different thematic baskets based on the principle 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'. A fourth stage began in March 2015 when the parties failed to meet their own deadline to conclude an agreement. The Special Envoys thus broadened the talks by creating IGAD-Plus forum and stepped up the pressure on the parties. This led to the signing of ARCSS on 17 and 26 August 2015.

55. The lack of political will of the warring parties undermined the effectiveness of the incremental strategy. The parties at several occasions backtracked on agreements reached, which obliged the Special Envoys to re-open negotiations. After signing the CoH agreement, violence did not stop and the parties disagreed on the composition of the oversight body, the MVM, which led to significant delays in its deployment. Another example was inclusivity, which the parties agreed to in the 9 May 2014 agreement, but continued to resist the inclusion of non-military stakeholders in the talks. This prevented IGAD from locking in achievements and focusing on subsequent issues in the negotiations.
56. The long duration of the negotiations was similarly a result of a lack of political will by the warring parties. However, several interviewees argued that the complexity of the negotiations also played a role. The mediation team was committed to a broad agenda, not only tackling immediate security issues, but also enshrining reforms to bring South Sudan on the path of democratic governance. ARCSS has sub-chapters on power sharing, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, resources and environmental protection, transitional justice and security arrangements. All of these topics relate to root causes of the conflict in South Sudan.
57. The strategy pursued by IGAD successfully engaged the parties in a negotiation process, which culminated in a comprehensive final agreement. However, the focus on building momentum through written agreements, rather than improving the relationship between the parties, did not foster the requisite reconciliation for a sustainable peace agreement. The absence of trust between the parties undermined the implementation of the agreement later on.



## **Lessons for IGAD mediation**

58. *It is useful for IGAD to articulate its mediation strategy for the specific process at hand, not least to foster a common understanding within the mediation team and with the parties. The strategy should be developed by the mediation team and linked to an analysis of the overall conflict. It should be regularly updated to take into account a quickly changing context.*
59. *An incremental mediation strategy, building momentum through successive agreements, is well suited to contexts, where the commitment of the parties is tenuous. At the same time, the mediation strategy should focus on developing trust between the parties, realizing that their willingness to make peace is the main engine of progress. Direct meetings between the principals are important in this regard.*
60. *An effective incremental strategy requires that the conflict parties abide by agreements reached in different stages of the processes. This is especially important for a CoH, which requires a fully fleshed out agreement and the immediate deployment of a monitoring body to provide reliable information, reassure the parties of each other's compliance and build trust between them.*
61. *In protracted conflicts, it is important for IGAD mediators to assist the negotiating parties in setting a clear agenda, which addresses the root causes of conflict. At the same time, mediation processes should make sure the agenda is not overburdened and continue the negotiations until parties have genuinely reached an agreement.*

## **Theme #6: Inclusion of non-military stakeholders**

### ***Experience from the South Sudan peace talks***

62. From the outset, IGAD showed a strong commitment to an inclusive process, going beyond the warring parties. Inclusivity was one of the cornerstones of the political mandate given to the Special Envoys, reiterated multiple times by IGAD Heads of State and Government. According to some observers, this was a lesson learned from the CPA, which was criticized for its exclusive nature, focusing on power sharing between the warring parties rather than a broader agenda of societal transformation. The Troika countries also promoted inclusivity and provided funds for broad-based talks.
63. As a first measure towards a more inclusive process, the Special Envoys decided to push for the release of the FDs and their inclusion

at the negotiation table. This absorbed a lot of energy in the second stage of the talks because both GRSS and IO were reluctant to broaden the talks to include non-military stakeholders such as the FDs. It was only in the 9 May 2014 agreement that they committed “to ensure the inclusion of all South Sudan stakeholders in the peace process, and the negotiation of a transitional government of national unity in order to ensure broad ownership of the agreed outcomes; stakeholders include: the two direct negotiators (the GRSS and the SPLM/A in opposition), and others such as the SPLM leaders (former detainees), political parties, civil society, and faith-based leaders.” However, the interviews revealed a difference in interpretation in terms of what this clause meant. The mediators sought to include non-military stakeholders at the table with voting rights, whereas the parties believed they would be observers.

64. All interviewees agreed that operationalizing the inclusion of non-military stakeholders proved challenging. Upon their release, the FDs constituted their own delegation, participated in the peace talks throughout, signed ARCSS and subsequently joined the TGoNU. Representatives of the fourteen so-called ‘other political parties’ were divided between those loyal to the GRSS and others with an independent agenda. They nonetheless participated with their own delegation in the August 2014 round of talks, but were prevented from traveling to attend subsequent rounds of talks. This effectively ended the participation of other political parties at the talks. As a result, they were not signatories to ARCSS, although the agreement provided for a small percentage of seats for other political parties in transitional institutions.
65. As far as civil society was concerned, IGAD initiated a multi-stakeholder symposium for civil society to voice their views and select representatives to join the official talks. The symposium took place from 5 to 7 June 2014 in Addis Ababa with around 200 participants. The selection process for civil society representatives at the official talks proved contentious, as the warring parties co-opted many participants. The Sudd Institute paper commissioned for this project mentions this as a problem, along with the loose organization and elite nature of South Sudanese civil society. Moreover, it appears that some civil society representatives felt exposed at the symposium, fearing repercussions back home.<sup>22</sup>
66. The result was that the multi-stakeholder symposium was a one-off event, rather than becoming a permanent feature of the process. Moreover, the seven-member civil society delegation chosen at the symposium consisted of a majority of persons loyal

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<sup>22</sup> Paper by Sudd Institute, commissioned for the present lessons learned exercise.

to the main parties, therefore mirroring the divisions at the table and ultimately defeating the purpose of a separate civil society representation. As a result, over time, the mediation no longer included civil society at the negotiation table and treated them as observers. Civil society representatives did however attend the different rounds of talks. They were able to interact with the parties and the Special Envoys and present position papers in thematic committees. Noteworthy in this connection is the formation of a women's bloc towards the end of the talks. They managed to raise women's issues at the talk, but its impact on the process was ultimately limited, given its late formation.

67. Within the delegations as well as the mediation team, the gender balance was lopsided. The GRSS initially declared its intention to include 25% women in their delegation, but could not realize this. Within the mediation team, there was only one female adviser. According to interviewees, this made it difficult for the mediation team to advocate for an equal gender balance within the negotiating delegations.
68. Throughout the mediation process, the IGAD Special Envoys were committed to reaching out to different actors and constituencies in South Sudan. They conducted consultations with women's groups, youth, religious leaders, veterans, political parties and civil society. However, most of these consultations took place only in capitals and there was little engagement with the national media. According to the commissioned background paper, this contributed to a feeling of detachment and lack of transparency in parts of South Sudanese society.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

69. *Sustainable peace requires that all major stakeholders are given a voice in peace talks. It is important, as IGAD has done in South Sudan, to reach out beyond the warring parties. In this regard, it is important that IGAD involves civil society in its mediation engagements in order to anchor the process locally and to make sure it addresses the concerns of a broad range of stakeholders. Public outreach by IGAD mediators and senior advisers, for example by holding consultative meetings at all levels and engaging with the national media, is also important.*
70. *Inclusive processes with multiple stakeholders are more difficult to manage, but at the same time, they have the potential to increase the impact and legitimacy of peace talks. However, IGAD Special*

<sup>23</sup> Paper by Sudd Institute, commissioned for the present lessons learned exercise.

*Envoys need to be aware that pushing for inclusivity against the will of the main parties negatively affects the parties' ownership and the perceived impartiality of the mediation process.*

71. *Depending on the context, IGAD mediators should consider indirect forms of participation for civil society, for example consultative forums or bilateral meetings. Consultation forums should ideally be permanent mechanisms that interact with the official talks but are structurally separate. When designing these forums, IGAD should ensure the distinct voices of civil society are preserved and obtain guarantees from the conflict parties that the safety of participants is ensured.*
72. *Selection mechanisms and questions of representation are sensitive when it comes to inclusion formats. Self-selection among participants invited to civil society conferences is empowering, but it is also risky if civil society is not sufficiently organized. IGAD should also consider other mechanisms, such as selection by the mediators based on applications.*
73. *Principles of gender sensitivity along with the international Women, Peace and Security agenda stipulates adequate representation of women in mediation teams and delegations. The more gender balanced IGAD mediation teams are, the bigger the authority with which IGAD can speak to gender sensitivity issues. Beyond representation, gender sensitivity means that the agenda of talks should represent issues that relate to the specific concerns of men and women in conflict areas.*

## **Theme #7: Use of leverage**

### ***Experience from the South Sudan peace talks***

74. Ripeness for conflict resolution through mediation and negotiation requires that two conditions are fulfilled: the parties find themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate, and they see a way out of the conflict through a negotiated settlement. Ripeness means the parties' cost-benefit calculation shifts from war to peace. At the same time, the parties become increasingly cognizant of the benefits of reconciliation and a negotiated settlement with the other side. In other words, ripeness means that parties realize a military victory is not possible, that a negotiated settlement brings benefits and that these benefits exceed the benefits of continued warfare.
75. Throughout the South Sudan peace talks, the ripeness conditions remained unfulfilled. This partly explains why the parties continued

to use armed violence and why they failed to genuinely negotiate a settlement and fully implement the resulting agreements. The lack of ripeness was the primary obstacle for the IGAD-led mediation process from beginning to end.

76. To change the parties' cost-benefit calculation, IGAD and the international community applied leverage. This included strong diplomatic pressure throughout and especially during the fourth stage of the process from March 2015 until the signature of ARCSS. Measures to build leverage over the parties included the announcement of a regional intervention force in March 2014 and the imposition of targeted sanctions against certain individuals representing GRSS and IO first by the US government, then by the EU Council and finally by the UN Security Council. These measures further included threats to impose an arms embargo against South Sudan through the UN Security Council, binding for all UN member states.
77. Some of the leverage-generating measures helped to recommit the parties to the peace talks and compelled them to sign agreements. For example, interviewees explained that the pressure that was applied after the signing of ARCSS by IO was instrumental for the GRSS's decision to sign the agreement nine days later. Indeed, the US had tabled a resolution at the UN Security Council on 20 August 2015 threatening to escalate UN sanctions to include an arms embargo as well as additional targeted sanctions against senior leaders if GRSS failed to sign the agreement within two weeks.<sup>24</sup> However, the effectiveness of pressure tools in the mediation process was generally limited. They did not alter the cost-benefit calculation of the parties in a sustainable manner.
78. Pressure tools were at times even counterproductive. This was the case when threats were not followed through. One example is the regional protection force, which the IGAD Summit of 13 March 2014 authorized under the label of Protection and Deterrent Force. However, GRSS resisted the deployment of a peace enforcement mission, there were disagreements among IGAD member states about the composition and mandate of the force, and the relationship of the force with UN structures remained unclear. The force consequently failed to be deployed, thereby undermining the credibility and leverage of IGAD. The controversy that non-consensual interventions generated also had a negative impact on the unity and cohesion of the international community, as evidenced by lengthy discussions about whether or not an

<sup>24</sup> The text of the draft resolution of the UN Security Council tabled by the US is available from the blog UN Report: <http://un-report.blogspot.ch/2015/08/us-draft-resolution-on-south-sudan.html>.

arms embargo was an appropriate response to the situation in South Sudan.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

79. *IGAD mediation strategies need to provide a realistic assessment about what mediation can, and cannot, achieve in a given context. International actors should work to build the parties' confidence in the process and in each other. The mediators and peace process supporters should not rush the process of negotiations. In the interests of sustainable peace, there may be no alternative to 'strategic patience' until a sufficient degree of consensus and reconciliation among the parties has been reached.*
80. *Mediation relies on the consent of the parties and its success depends on the overall political context. In some situations, leverage can be useful to nudge parties towards a settlement, provided that threatened consequences are followed through. At the same time, the engine of progress in mediation must be the genuine willingness of the parties to make peace. IGAD mediators need to be aware that power diplomacy has negative effects in terms of the parties' ownership of the process and their perception of the mediators' impartiality.*

## **Theme #8: Negotiation dynamics and drafting agreements**

### ***Experience from South Sudan peace talks***

81. The IGAD Special Envoys organized successive negotiation sessions with the parties, lasting from a few days to several weeks, followed by recesses to allow for consultations. The mediators' strategy was to build momentum around the adoption of successive intermediary agreements, incrementally advancing the process towards a final comprehensive agreement. Intermediary deals included the agreements on a CoH and detainees (both January 2014), the framework of the talks (May 2014) and the formation of a TGoNU (February 2015). These agreements culminated in ARCSS as the final agreement ending the mediation process.
82. The mediation team used a range of methods to advance the talks. They held separate meetings with the parties to prepare for negotiations. They also at times engaged in shuttle diplomacy, as for example in January 2014 when the Special Envoys travelled to Juba and Pagak to meet with President Kiir and Machar in order to iron out differences regarding the CoH agreement. The

most common method, however, were face-to-face negotiations. During the second stage of the talks, the mediators introduced a committee structure. This included a range of thematic committees and a leadership committee, which functioned as a clearing house and where negotiations across themes took place. The mediators periodically organized workshops on specific themes, inviting external experts for guest presentations.

83. Negotiations revolved around draft texts of agreements. The mediation used the single-text method to this end. For each subsection of the agreement, the mediation team used different colors to capture text that had been agreed, text that was disputed, propositions by the parties and compromise suggestions by the mediation team. The result was a 'rainbow document', which the parties were meant to negotiate and develop into an agreed text. This method functioned well and helped advance the negotiations. However, according to some interviewees, its effectiveness was undermined by the mediators' insertion of new text, which the parties had not negotiated, in between negotiating sessions.
84. The approach of the mediation to agreement drafting changed during the fourth stage of the negotiations. Concluding that the parties were unable to agree on a text, the mediation team proceeded to draft a compromise agreement, which the IGAD Special Envoys presented to the parties and to IGAD-Plus partners on 25 July 2015. The parties were given time to negotiate the compromise agreement and jointly agree on changes. To that effect, the mediation team organized negotiation sessions in Addis Ababa. However, the parties proved unable to agree on changes to the text of the compromise agreement and they were therefore presented with a 'take it or leave it' choice by the mediators. IGAD subsequently convened a Summit to for a final push towards signing the agreement. When IGAD Heads of State and Government met in Addis Ababa in mid-August 2015, the leaders of the conflict parties engaged in final negotiations. This resulted in some amendments of the agreement, which IO, FDs and other stakeholders signed on 17 August, while GRSS deferred its signature. As several interviewees pointed out, the top-down nature of producing the draft reduced the parties' ownership of the final agreement. This was compounded by the strong diplomatic pressure exerted on them to sign ARCSS.
85. Overall, a negative negotiation dynamic prevailed during the process. This reflects the above-mentioned lack of ripeness: the warring parties were not genuinely willing to make peace with each other. From the beginning, there was high mistrust

between the main parties, in particular GRSS and IO. This affected the interactions of the negotiating delegations, which were characterized by mutual suspicion, according to observers. With the exception of IGAD Summits, the principals were unwilling to talk to each other face-to-face. Many interviewees mentioned the absence of direct engagement between the leaders as a problematic aspect, despite the efforts of the Special Envoys to shuttle between them. This deprived the process of an effective deadlock-breaking mechanism, which had been a key factor during the CPA negotiations.

86. Another challenge for the mediation, which several interviewees identified, was the fragmentation within the delegations. Members of the same delegations disagreed with each other, delegations were re-shuffled, and it was at times unclear whether principals had approved a given position. This meant that delegates in technical negotiations were often not empowered to take decisions and that compromises reached required re-negotiation, which slowed down progress.
87. The schedule of the talks was often set in advance so the parties knew how long the negotiation sessions would last. This provided clarity, but it meant that negotiations were sometimes halted prematurely, preventing mediators from capitalizing on progress made in a given round. Several interviewees mentioned the round of talks in Bahir Dar in September 2014 as an example. The parties engaged in substantive negotiations, made progress on key power-sharing issue, but the negotiations ended prematurely.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

88. *Using a diversity of mediation methods, including proxy talks, shuttle diplomacy and face-to-face negotiations, is useful to advance negotiations. When dealing with a large set of issues, the committee structure used by the South Sudan mediation helps to manage the complexity of the negotiations. Committee negotiations require that delegates are duly empowered and that an effective clearing house and cross-issue negotiating mechanism exists.*
89. *Building trust between adversaries is a key component of any mediation process and IGAD mediators should make this a priority. This concerns the relationship between delegations at the talks, but most importantly between the leaders of the conflict parties. Direct engagement between them to negotiate the most difficult issues and break deadlocks is crucial and should be encouraged.*



90. *Adopting agreements incrementally is a good way to build momentum and to mark the passage from one phase to the next. In highly polarized negotiation settings, it is useful for the mediation team to assist the parties in drafting an agreement. The more the text reflects compromises the parties have themselves negotiated, rather than the mediation team's 'best guess' or 'imposition', the larger the ownership they feel over the agreement.*
91. *Discord within negotiating delegations is a serious problem. IGAD mediators should be attentive to the discord and avoid actions that may escalate it. They may need to engage in intra-party mediation or work with other third parties to this end. For negotiations to proceed smoothly, all members of a delegation must be duly empowered.*
92. *IGAD mediation is most effective when there is political momentum. The timing and sequencing of talks should be adapted accordingly. Interruptions should be avoided when there is positive dynamic in the negotiation process.*

## **Theme #9: Implementation**

### ***Experience from South Sudan peace talks***

93. The main idea underpinning ARCSS, and indeed IGAD's main approach to conflict resolution in South Sudan, was power sharing between the parties during a transition phase until regular constitutional order was reinstated through elections. The agreement divided representation in political institutions in terms of seats and percentages, and likewise in the security sector, where it specified the number of troops permitted to be stationed in and around Juba. A similar logic of power sharing across state institutions prevailed in the CPA, with the National Congress Party and the SPLM as the main parties. In power sharing agreements, the main engine of implementation is trust and a cooperative political relationship between the main parties. However, as mentioned above, mistrust characterized the relations between the parties right up to the point at which ARCSS was signed, which rendered implementation difficult if not impossible.
94. The signature of ARCSS was achieved with significant diplomatic pressure. In the period between 17 August 2015, when IO, FDs and other stakeholders signed the agreement in Addis Ababa, and 26 August when GRSS signed it in Juba, international partners explicitly threatened to expand the UN sanctions regime with an arms embargo. The pressure was successful insofar as the parties signed ARCSS. However, as mentioned above, it also

threw parties' ownership into doubt and cast a shadow over the implementation period. South Sudan exemplifies a well-known dilemma in mediation research: the international community focuses on a conflict situation and creates strong incentives to achieve a peace agreement. Once the parties sign the agreement, the attention of the international community shifts elsewhere and the incentives for parties to continue engaging in the peace process are weakened. The result is incomplete implementation of the agreement in the best case and collapse in the worst case.

95. IGAD mediators were aware of the importance of implementation. They mobilized international support and invested significant time and resources in negotiating detailed plans for this purpose. The CoH agreement of January 2014 had a separate implementation plan, which the parties adopted as a standalone agreement on 24 February 2014 and which specified the roles and responsibilities of an international body, the MVM, and the parties' own mechanism, the Joint Technical Committee (JTC), to oversee implementation. In subsequent months, despite delays, the MVM was deployed to the ground and periodically issued reports, which documented ceasefire violations by the parties. The effectiveness of the MVM was generally limited, as the parties restricted its freedom of movement and as the JTC, which was meant to enable communication between the parties and address violations identified by the MVM, proved to be dysfunctional. The absence of a functioning CoH undermined the effectiveness of the incremental mediation strategy.
96. ARCSS had a detailed implementation plan as an annex. The agreement created a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to oversee implementation and dedicated a chapter to specify its composition and mandate. JMEC was subsequently constituted and the former President of Botswana, Festus Gontebanye Mogae, appointed as its chair. However, JMEC failed to keep ARCSS implementation on track. One problem was that it took several months for JMEC to be up and running. President Mogae was only appointed in late October 2015, nearly two months after ARCSS was signed. Another problem was that the IGAD Special Envoys and most of their staff, who had detailed knowledge of the process and the agreement, left. The breadth and level of detail of the agreement also dissipated focus on priority issues. Most importantly, independent of JMEC, ARCSS implementation was difficult because parties lacked political will and ownership of the agreement and the international community failed to maintain its focus and its support for the peace process in South Sudan.

## **Lessons for IGAD mediation**

97. *A peace agreement is not the end point, but rather an important stage in a broader peace process. Implementation therefore represents a crucial phase and IGAD should consider it part and parcel of its mediation engagement.*
98. *If the parties are not ready to make peace, pushing them to sign an agreement prematurely is perilous. If international pressure and guarantees cannot be maintained during the implementation phase and beyond, there is a high risk that the agreement does not hold. Failed implementation of agreements sets a negative precedent for future talks.*
99. *IGAD should make sure that at least some of the staff that were part of the mediation team are also part of the post-agreement monitoring structure, providing further mediation services if needed.*
100. *Five factors increase the chance of successful implementation of IGAD-facilitated peace agreements: the parties' ownership of the agreement and their willingness to make the transition from war to peace; a realistic implementation plan; the immediate setup of a robust monitoring mechanism prior to adoption of the agreement; sufficient funding for implementation-related tasks; and continued regional and international support for the peace process. IGAD mediators should work towards fulfilment of these factors in order to maximize chances for successful implementation.*

## **Theme #10: International support and mediation partnerships**

### ***Experience from South Sudan peace talks***

101. The IGAD Special Envoys were successful in rallying international support for the South Sudan peace talks. They interacted closely with the Troika countries, the AU, the UN, the EU as well as with other influential actors such as China, either in bilateral settings or through the IGAD Partner Forum (IPF) and later through the IGAD-Plus framework.
102. In addition to its general outreach, IGAD had partnerships with other mediating organizations, notably the UN and the AU. The UN through its peacekeeping mission provided information about the situation in South Sudan and supported the negotiations through expertise, e.g. on ceasefire. The AU provided political support to IGAD mediation and took the lead on accountability issues in

the peace process. This involved establishing the Commission of Inquiry and agreeing to host the special court stipulated by ARCSS. Nevertheless, the AU was perceived as not having fully used its leverage and too little was done to synchronize statements and actions among the two organizations. Joint meetings and reflection sessions were only done at a late stage and usually in an ad-hoc manner.

103. The IGAD Special Envoys held regular briefings with key partners, making sure that they remained informed about the process and would deliver consistent messages to the parties. Besides meetings with the IPF, the Special Envoys communicated through bilateral channels. They often interacted with Troika countries and the EU, which lent political and financial support to the process and regularly engaged with the parties. Noteworthy is that the Special Envoys managed to secure China's active support for the mediation process. For example, in January 2015, China coordinated with the IGAD mediation and organized a meeting in Khartoum aimed at breaking the impasse between the warring parties.
104. The IPF consists of 35 countries that are loosely grouped together without regular exchange. Italy and Ethiopia co-chair the Forum, which was established before the South Sudan mediation with the aim to support IGAD politically and financially. During the process, Italy, on behalf of the IPF, was invited to participate in the open part of the extraordinary IGAD Summits and other events surrounding the process. The group issued some statements in support of the IGAD mediation process. Outside of the IPF, Norway and China had a particularly important relationship with the IGAD mediation and were regularly consulted and briefed.
105. Throughout the process, the Special Envoys used the leverage of international partners to advance the process. For example, a high-level visit to Juba by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and US Secretary of State John Kerry in early May 2014 was used to push GRSS and IO to engage face-to-face and to commit to an inclusive peace process. Shortly after, on 9 May 2014, the parties signed the framework agreement.
106. The formation of IGAD-Plus was announced in March 2015. Based on IGAD's experience in Somalia, the format was supposed to reinvigorate the mediation process, create a unified international front and mobilize the active participation of partners. The initiative succeeded in generating renewed international support for the mediation process, both politically and financially, and it helped to prevent forum shopping. However, IGAD-Plus did not

significantly change the nature of the negotiations, as the parties' willingness to make peace continued to be tenuous.

107. In the second half of 2014, Tanzania and South Africa launched a separate process in Arusha to foster reconciliation within the SPLM. This process was compatible with the IGAD-led talks, as SPLM reconciliation was considered a condition for the success of the overall political talks. However, a number of interviewees argued that the Arusha process was not fully linked and at times disrupted the IGAD-led talks.

### ***Lessons for IGAD mediation***

108. *IGAD mediation efforts are strengthened when backed by international partners who deliver consistent messages to the conflict parties about the need to make peace.*
109. *Mediators can interact with different 'circles' of international partners based on who has influence in a given context. There are benefits to institutionalizing international engagement, as the IPF and IGAD-Plus showed. Enlarging the circle of partners is useful to deepen international support, but it brings challenges in terms of additional coordination and the need to accommodate potentially contradictory interests.*
110. *In its mediation engagements, IGAD benefits from coordinating with other mediating organizations, especially the **RECs**, UN, AU and EU. They can provide political and financial support, information and expertise during the process and assistance for the implementation of agreements.*
111. *Standing partnership agreements are useful to consolidate cooperation between mediating organizations. They can facilitate the provision of technical expertise and speed up crisis response. In cases where divisions between member states impair the cohesion of sub-regional organizations, arrangements to share political responsibility with the UN and AU, and even the joint conduct of the mediation process, should be considered.*
112. *A common strategy of mediators and international partners, setting clear priorities and avoiding divisive issues, helps to advance the mediation process. Diplomatic initiatives by international partners need to be synchronized with the mediation and be consistent with the overall strategy. Parallel dialogue processes need to be properly coordinated and linked to the main political negotiations.*

## Theme #11: Funding and logistics

### *Experience from the South Sudan peace talks*

113. The South Sudan peace talks were challenging from a logistical point of view, owing to a high frequency of meetings, relatively large delegations and security requirements. For each round of the talks, IGAD arranged flights and accommodation for members of delegations, organized a venue, liaised with the host country on security and protocol issues and dealt with a number of other logistical demands. This was time consuming and expensive and required the attention of Special Envoys and senior members of the team. The IGAD Secretariat initially handled logistics, before some of these functions were transferred to the Office of the Special Envoys for South Sudan.
114. The peace talks primarily took place in Ethiopia. The first rounds of talks were organized in large hotels in Addis Ababa. These venues were practical for easy access and proximity to an international airport and to the Office of the Special Envoys. They also facilitated interactions with representatives of the international community. However, holding the talks in a large city also provided for distractions and made it more difficult for the mediators to control the environment around the negotiations. A later round of the talks, in September 2014, took place in a resort hotel in Bahir Dar, providing for a more secluded environment. This venue was useful to keep the parties focused, as several interviewees emphasized the progress of the negotiations in Bahir Dar.
115. The South Sudan peace talks required significant financial resources. Funding for the IGAD-led mediation process came primarily from Norway, EU, US and some others. Funds were quickly pledged, but it took a while until IGAD could spend them. The above-mentioned Transitional Support Unit, and general mediation-related funds of the IGAD Secretariat, were used as stopgap. This points to the importance of a startup mediation fund, such as the Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy Fund created via a resolution of the IGAD Committee of Ambassadors of 15 June 2017. Overall, sufficient financial resources were available for the smooth conduct of the South Sudan peace talks. IGAD interacted on a frequent basis with donors, who were also political supporters of the process. However, some interviewees mentioned that donors put pressure on the mediation team to speed up the process, which proved unhelpful.

## **Lessons for IGAD mediation**

116. *It is crucial that logistics are handled professionally and that mediation teams include support staff for administrative and logistical matters.*
117. *The venue for talks should be suitable for supporting peace talks. Depending on the phase of the process, the need for confidentiality versus outreach, security issues and the preferences of the parties, a central location in a large city or a more secluded venue may be most appropriate.*
118. *It is crucial that IGAD mediation efforts are adequately funded, allowing mediators to focus on the process and not face financial constraints in their work. The IGAD Secretariat should work with the mediation team by providing logistical support, fundraising and donor support. IGAD member states should endow the recently created Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy Fund with sufficient resources to enable a swift start of IGAD mediation engagements.*
119. *It is useful for IGAD mediators to regularly interact with the donors of a process, also to secure their political buy-in. However, mediation is compromised when donors use the power of the purse to influence the process and artificially speed up the process.*
120. *Member states should pay for IGAD's mediations instead of relying on non-African donors. This would serve the interests of African autonomy of action, regional ownership of peace initiatives and avoidance of donor leverage.*

# Annexes

## Annex #1: Milestones of the IGAD South Sudan mediation process

15 December 2013	Shootout between presidential guards, violence spreads in Juba and different parts of South Sudan within days
19 December 2013	3-day emergency visit of IGAD Council of Ministers to Juba
27 December 2013	Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Nairobi, Communiqué mandates IGAD-led mediation process by calling for an “all-inclusive dialogue”
4 January 2014	South Sudan peace talks begin in Addis Ababa
23 January 2014	Agreements on CoH and on Status of Detainees signed by GRSS and SPLM/A-IO in Addis Ababa
31 January 2014	Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Addis Ababa, Communiqué endorses 23 January agreement and instructs IGAD Special Envoys to develop framework for next phase of negotiations
2 February 2014	Establishment of the MVM by the JTC
24 February 2014	Agreement on implementation modalities of CoH
13 March 2014	Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Addis Ababa, Communiqué “authorizes the prompt deployment of a Protection and Deterrent Force”, reaffirms inclusive political dialogue involving former detainees, other political parties and civil society, and welcomes establishment of AU Commission of Inquiry
1 April 2014	First deployment of MVM teams in Bor and Bentiu
5 May 2014	Parties sign the Recommitment on Humanitarian Matters of the CoH
9 May 2014	Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan, in which parties agree in principle about the formation of a TGoNU and commit to inclusive negotiations with FDs, political



parties, civil society, and faith-based leaders

- 5 June 2014 Start of multi-stakeholder symposium in Addis Ababa with around 200 representatives from across South Sudanese society
- 10 June 2014 Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Addis Ababa, Communiqué specifies a 60-day period to complete dialogue on the formation of the TGoNU and urges parties “to move immediately to inclusive negotiations on substantive issues”
- 25 August 2014 Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Addis Ababa, Communiqué endorses Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards the Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan (signed by GRSS), calls on SPLM/A-IO to sign it and calls on parties to comply with the agreement on TGoNU within 45 days
- 22 September 2014 Talks move to Bahir Dar, Ethiopia; negotiations between the parties about TGoNU
- 22 October 2014 IGAD Mini-Summit in Juba with Heads of State and Government of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan to discuss the outcomes of the negotiation session in Bahir Dar
- 7 November 2014 Extraordinary IGAD Summit in Addis Ababa, resolution threatens collective action against parties violating CoH and stipulates that IGAD region will “take necessary measures to directly intervene in South Sudan to protect life and restore peace and stability”
- 9 November 2014 Signature of the Matrix on the Implementation of the CoH agreement
- 21 January 2015 Signature of the Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM and conclusion of the Arusha process
- 2 February 2015 Signature of the Agreement on the Establishment of the TGoNU
- 3 March 2015 Adoption by UN Security Council of resolution 2206, establishment of a sanctions regime for South Sudan
- 11 March 2015 Announcement of creation of IGAD Plus

- 24 March 2015 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council threatening the imposition of an arms embargo against South Sudan
- Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué announces establishment of AU Ad hoc Committee with members from Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa
- 2 June 2015 Appointment of former Malian president Alpha Oumar Konaré as the AU High Representative for South Sudan with mandate to coordinate “African action” in support of the peace process in South Sudan
- 14 June 2015 IGAD launches IGAD-Plus on the margins of the AU Summit in Johannesburg
- 24 July 2015 Release of draft compromise agreement, following meeting of IGAD-Plus in Addis Ababa
- 17 August 2015 Signature of ARCSS by SPLM-IO, FDs and other stakeholders in Addis Ababa
- 26 August 2015 Signature of ARCSS by GRSS in Juba, but at the same time submission of a 12-page document with reservations against ARCSS
- 21 October 2015 Appointment of former President Festus Mogae of Botswana as Chairperson of JMEC
- 26 April 2016 Riek Machar returns to Juba
- 8 July 2016 Fighting re-eruptes in Juba between guards of the President and Vice President; Vice President Riek Machar flees out of the country
- 23 July 2016 Taban Deng Gai is appointed as First Vice President

- **Agreements**  
What were the main milestones in the process in terms of agreements? How did agreements build on each other? How and by whom were the agreements drafted? What were the decision-making modalities? How did agreements specify implementation modalities?
- **Implementation**  
How was the transfer from mediation to implementation handled? What was IGAD's role during the implementation? How were implementation modalities specified?
- **Other processes**  
What other dialogue processes took place during the IGAD mediation? Did these efforts complement the IGAD effort?
- **External actors**  
How did IGAD reach out to external actors? How was the leverage of external actors used? How did IGAD interact with the Troika? How did IGAD interact with UN and AU? Why was IGAD Plus created?
- **Funding and logistics**  
How were the talks funded? Were sufficient funds available? What was the role of donors in the process? How were logistics handled?

## Annex #2: Questionnaire for lessons learned interviews

### *General question in the beginning:*

What are your lessons of the IGAD South Sudan mediation process?

### *Specific questions on themes:*

#### - *Early action*

When did IGAD get involved? What did IGAD do to prevent conflict? What was the impact of IGAD's early actions? How was coordination with other external actors?

#### - *Mandate and setup*

When was the process set up? What mandate did the Special Envoys receive? How was the mandate discussed with the parties? How was consent regarding mandate and process obtained from the parties? How did the mandates evolve?

#### - *Mediation strategy*

What strategy did the mediators pursue? How was conflict analysis incorporated into the strategy? What was the division of labor among the special envoys? How did mediation interact with other forms of intervention? How did the mediators build their relationship with the parties? How did the mediators build trust between the parties?

#### - *Structure of the process*

What were the main issues under discussion? How was the agenda established? When were talks held? How long did rounds of talks last? How were talks structured? How were the talks sequenced? What was the role of shuttle diplomacy?

#### - *Participation and inclusivity*

Who participated in the talks? Who sat at the table and who were observers? According to which criteria were they selected? How were women represented? What was IGAD's experience with the multi-stakeholder process? How were stakeholders selected and according to which criteria? How did mediators and parties interact with them?

#### - *Special envoys and mediation team*

How and by whom were the mediators supported? How did the mediation team and the special envoy work? How did the mediation team work with the IGAD Secretariat? How did the special envoys interact with IGAD Summits?

## Annex #3: Selected publications on mediation in South Sudan

Abraham Awolich: *The Mediation Pendulum and the Challenges that Underlie the Peace Implementation in South Sudan*, paper published by the Sudd Institute, Dec 2015

Zacharia D. Akol: *Inclusivity: A Challenge to the IGAD-led South Sudanese Peace Process*, paper by the Sudd Institute, December 2014

Kasaija Phillip Apuuli: *IGAD's Mediation in the Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges*, published in 'African Security', 2015

Irit Back: *IGAD, Sudan, and South Sudan: Achievements and setbacks of regional mediation*, published in 'The Journal of Middle East and Africa', 2016

International Crisis Group: *South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name*, April 2014

International Crisis Group: *South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD Peace Process*, July 2015

Jok Madut Jok: *Negotiating an End to the Current Civil War in South Sudan*, paper published by the Berghof Foundation and CINEP, 2015


Zach Vertin: *A Poisoned Well - Lessons in Mediation from South Sudan's Troubled Peace Process*, paper published by the International Peace Institute, April 2018

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